Final day: Submissions to third DSM-5 stakeholder review

Final day: Submissions to third DSM-5 stakeholder review

Post #183 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-2fn

The third and final stakeholder review is scheduled to close today, Friday, June 15.

I am collating copies of submissions on these pages.

A copy of my own comment is published below in text and PDF format. If you are unable to submit your own letter or short of time, please consider endorsing Mary Dimmock’s submission or one of the other submissions or one from last year with a note to say that although the criteria have been revised since last year, the underlying concerns remain.

 

Submission from UK advocate Suzy Chapman

Full text in PDF:     Chapman DSM-5 submission 2012

For the attention of the Somatic Symptom Disorders Work Group: Chair Joel E. Dimsdale, M.D.

Submitted by Suzy Chapman, advocate and parent/carer of young adult with chronic illness.
Website owner of https://dxrevisionwatch.wordpress.com formerly http://dsm5watch.wordpress.com

Submission in response to J 00 Somatic Symptom Disorder

I note that at June 14, APA has published no report on the results of the DSM-5 field trials. The majority of stakeholders wishing to provide feedback on this third release of draft proposals have no information on the make-up of the SSD study groups, the numbers studied within each of the three arms or the resulting data.

  • Stakeholders have been obliged to submit comment without the benefit of scrutiny of field trial results to inform their submissions. This is not acceptable.

For the first and second release of draft proposals, a 7 page “Disorders Description” document and a 14 page “Rationale/Validity Propositions/Justification of Criteria” document accompanied proposals and expanded on the website Proposals, Criteria, Rationale and Severity content for this category section. In the case of the latter, this included five pages of references to published and unpublished papers, including a number of papers authored or co-authored by members of the SSD Work Group. With the release of this third and final draft, no updated versions of these two documents were published that reflect significant revisions to SSD criteria between the second and third draft. The unrevised versions have been removed from the website.

  • Stakeholders have been denied access to the more expansive rationales and validity propositions set out within these two documents, the research papers that have been relied on and more detailed explanations for the revisions made to criteria between the second and third iterations in response to field trial results and internal/external input. If the Work Group considered these documents essential background information for the first and second drafts it is unreasonable not to have provided stakeholders with updated versions for this third draft.

The “Rationale/Validity Propositions/Justification of Criteria” document (as published May 4, 2011, for the second public review) states:

“…It is unclear how these changes would affect the base rate of disorders now recognized as somatoform disorders. One might conclude that the rate of diagnosis of CSSD would fall, particularly if some disorders previously diagnosed as somatoform were now diagnosed elsewhere (such as adjustment disorder). On the other hand, there are also considerable data to suggest that physicians actively avoid using the older 6 diagnoses because they find them confusing or pejorative. So, with the CSSD classification, there may be an increase in diagnosis.”

Continued on Page 2

Patient submissions to third and final DSM-5 stakeholder review

Patient submissions to third and final DSM-5 stakeholder review

Post #182 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-2f5

This third and final stakeholder review is scheduled to close on Friday. If an extension is announced I will update.

As with the two previous draft reviews, in 2010 and 2011, I am collating copies of submissions on these pages.

If you have submitted to the Somatic Symptom Disorder proposals or are a professional, professional body or advocacy organization that has submitted a general response which includes reference to the  Somatic Symptom Disorder proposals I would be pleased to receive a copy for publication on this site. Submissions will be published subject to review and posted in PDF format if more than a few pages long.

The most recent submission received is from “US patient 1”. This is a detailed response which I am publishing in both text and PDF format. (Note that as far as I can see submissions can only be uploaded to the DSM-5 Development site using the RT or html text editor and not as file attachments.)

Submission from US patient 1 to J 00 SSD and J 02 Conversion Disorder (FNSD)

Full text in PDF:    DSM-5 submission

To: DSM-5 Task Force, Somatic Symptom Disorders Work Group
From: _______
Re: Response on the Proposals for Somatic Symptom Disorder and Conversion Disorder
Date: June 12, 2012

The DSM-5 Task Force has thus far failed to address the conceptual and practical problems inherent in DSM-IV somatoform disease constructs. Specifically, its proposals for Somatic Symptom Disorder and Conversion Disorder are actually more flawed than their equivalents in DSM-IV. The criteria for these two diagnoses rely excessively upon purely subjective judgments by clinicians and on the extent of a clinician’s awareness of known diseases, and lack the specificity required of valid diagnostic constructs.

To understand just how strongly subjectivity of clinical interpretation can impact diagnostic outcome when using somatoform disorder criteria on a disease with unknown etiology, it is instructive to consider in some detail Johnson et al’s “Assessing Somatization Disorder in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome”1, a study on the reliability of DSM-III-R somatization disorder (SD) criteria and related instruments when applied to patients with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). As the DSM-III-R SD diagnostic construct was less subjective and had greater specificity in terms of symptom presentation than the proposed SSD criteria, a careful examination of its flaws, as demonstrated by this study, offers a sobering perspective on real world application of SSD criteria.

CFS is a somatic disease of unestablished etiology; the United States Centers for Disease Control has stated that “Research shows that CFS is not a form of psychiatric illness” and that an essential criterion for its diagnosis is “severe chronic fatigue of 6 months or longer that is not explained by any medical or psychiatric diagnosis”. Nevertheless, in spite of such evidence, an opinion persists in the medical community that CFS is in some way a psychosomatic illness, an opinion which can easily influence clinicians in their diagnoses of patients who satisfy CFS criteria. Thus, as Johnson et al noted: “Whether or not symptoms of CFS are considered medically caused will strongly affect the incidence of SD within the CFS population…If the examiner recognizes that the patient’s CFS symptoms indicate a physical illness, the diagnosis of SD may not be made. Conversely, if the examiner does not consider CFS a medical illness, the patient’s symptom endorsement may lead to the diagnosis of SD.”

To begin with, Johnson et al discussed the problems with the DSM-III-R criteria for somatization disorder:

“According to DSM-III-R .. the diagnosis of somatization disorder (SD) requires a person to present with at least 13 symptoms for which no significant organic pathology can be found. The symptoms must have caused the person to take medication, to see a physician, or to have altered her/his lifestyle. The disorder begins before the age of 30 and has a chronic but fluctuating course. However, the diagnosis of SD is extremely problematic in terms of its validity because it involves a series of judgments that can be arbitrary and subjective […] Specifically, the interviewer must decide if the symptom reported is attributable to an identifiable medical illness. Although such judgments are extremely difficult to make uniformly, the influence of bias introduced by the interviewer’s orientation on the prevalence of SD has not been adequately addressed.”

They noted the high variation between the estimates of SD prevalence in CFS patient cohorts reported by previous studies and concluded that it was “in itself indicative of the problem in defining SD”. They further pointed out that “The difficulty in distinguishing among somatic symptoms that are psychiatric vs. organic in origin can result in overdiagnosis of SD in medical illness, particularly chronic illness”, as they had observed in several studies by other authors on somatization in CFS.

Final 2 days: Submissions to third DSM-5 stakeholder review

 

Final 2 days for Submissions to third DSM-5 stakeholder review

Post #181 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-2eX

There are only Thursday and Friday left before this third and final stakeholder review of proposals for DSM-5 categories and diagnostic criteria closes.

APA has failed to publish “full results” of its field trials – obliging professional, patient and public stakeholders to submit comment without the benefit of scrutinizing field trial data. That’s another APA schedule missed.

If any extension to the comment period is announced I will update.

The DSM-5 Development site has been slow to load, today, probably due to volume of traffic for both US and UK visitors and in some cases, not loading at all. If you are having problems try pulling up a page other than the Home Page and allow several minutes to load.

As with the two previous reviews, I am collating copies of submissions on these pages.

If you have submitted to the Somatic Symptom Disorder proposals or are a professional, professional body or advocacy organization that has submitted a general response which includes reference to the  Somatic Symptom Disorder proposals I would be pleased to receive a copy for publication on this site, subject to review, and posted in PDF format if more than a few pages long.

The most recent published submission is from “Joss”:

Submission from UK patient, Joss

I am writing to voice my concerns concerning the proposed category of Somatic Symptom Disorder.

Theoreticians of illness classification such as yourselves should be aware of the actual harm that could be caused to real people should this category be included in the DSM.

I would like to focus your minds with a real world example of how such a label might cause actual harm:

In 1998 I hurt my back. A scan showed a herniated disc but no further action was considered necessary. For the next three years my life was devastated by pain, I had bedsores and was pissing myself in bed from being unable to move. I believe that this was not taken seriously because I already had a pre-existing diagnosis of ME/CFS. The disbelief around my ME/CFS had already caused me problems obtaining the necessary help from medical services.

I believe that doctors thought I was ‘catastrophising’ and that had the SSD label been available to them they would have been able to categorise me as having:

‘Excessive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors related to these somatic symptoms or associated health concerns’

and, further, apply the three following highly subjective statements to me:

(1) Disproportionate and persistent thoughts about the seriousness of one’s symptoms.

(2) Persistently high level of anxiety about health or symptoms

(3) Excessive time and energy devoted to these symptoms or health concerns

I had CBT via a pain clinic but things got progressively worse. The CBT was of no help because it can not mend discs. I was, I admit, by this time feeling a tad suicidal because nobody would listen to me or believe that things were as bad as they were.

In 2001 I called an ambulance and went to the emergency department. The doctor was fine until he consulted my notes and saw I had an ME/CFS diagnosis. I was given morphine and they wanted to send me home.

It was only by refusing to leave that I gained admission to the hospital where a further scan was undertaken and it was found that a piece of disc had got in to my spinal canal and was pressing on my spinal cord. The next day I was in surgery and told that I would have been paralysed for life without it.

I would like you to reflect on how much worse the situation might have been if I had also been labelled as having SSD and on what happens when the SSD label is wrongly applied.

If someone is very ill and in pain is it not normal to feel distressed? How much distress is too much? Who decides what the right amount of distress for any given situation is?

What does ‘disproportionate’ mean in such a situation?

Is feeling anxious about such things not simply a normal and sane reaction to such circumstances?

And as for ‘excessive time and energy’ – well being bedridden and unable to move for whatever reason makes it a little hard to think of much else for much of the time.

To take such a lack of understanding of subjective experience of severe physical symptoms and construct a spurious and vague illness category from them is not only philosophically flawed it is dangerous to those who may be labelled in such a way.

This definition is far too vague and leaves far too much room for definitional ‘creep’, misinterpretation, misuse and even abuse.

It could certainly lead to possible missed diagnosis should a patient be placed in the SSD group and then continually disbelieved because of the label and left with no hope of getting to the bottom of the problem. To leave people without hope can only be called cruel

I am concerned that many illnesses such as ME/CFS, fibromyalgia and pain syndromes, and back problems which are often hard to diagnose and treat and can be a considerable burden to those who have to live with them will get drawn into the SSD basket and that, once there, patients will lose all hope of receiving any appropriate bio-medical treatment.

I am sure you are aware that medicine does move forward and that many illnesses once defined as psychiatric or psychological or simply beyond the reach of scientific clarity are now no longer considered ‘medically unexplained’. Just because there is currently no ‘medical’ explanation for a specific symptom and no understanding of how somebody might experience that symptom does not automatically render it a problem for psychology or psychiatry.

Call to action – DSM-5 comments needed by June 15, 2012

Call to action – DSM-5 comments needed by June 15, 2012

Post #173 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-2bO

The stakeholder comment period for the third and final review of draft proposals for DSM-5 categories and criteria closes on June 15. Patients, patient organizations and professional stakeholders have three weeks left in which to submit comments.

US advocate, Mary Dimmock, has prepared a “Call to action”

Call to action – DSM-5 comments needed by June 15, 2012

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is used in the U.S. to categorize mental disorders for patient diagnosis, treatment and insurance. The new version, DSM-5, includes a proposal for Somatic Symptom Disorder (SSD) that will have profound implications for ME/CFS patients. Your input is needed by June 15, 2012 to ensure that the DSM-5 authors understand your concerns…

…SSD can be applied to patients regardless of whether the symptoms are considered to be medically unexplainable or not. Severity is rated by the count and frequency of somatic symptoms. The “Justification for Criteria – Somatic Symptoms”, issued in May 2011, states that CBT, focused on “the identification and modification of dysfunctional and maladaptive beliefs”, is one of the most promising treatments.

Why this matters to ME/CFS patients
A diagnosis of SSD can be “bolted” onto any patient’s diagnosis. All that is required is for the medical practitioner to decide that the patient is excessively concerned with their somatic symptoms and their health. This is done using highly subjective and difficult to measure criteria for which very few independent reliability studies have been undertaken.

For patients with diseases that are poorly understood and misdiagnosed by the medical community, like ME/CFS, this will be disastrous. Once diagnosed inappropriately with SSD, the implications for diagnosis, treatment, disability and insurance will be profound…

Download Mary’s Call to action document here:

Word .docx format DSM-5 Response 2012

Word .doc format DSM-5 Response 2012 (MS 2004)

Somatic Symptom Disorder could capture millions more under mental health diagnosis

Somatic Symptom Disorder could capture millions more under mental health diagnosis

Post #172 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-29B

By Suzy Chapman | Dx Revision Watch

Update: My submission to the Somatic Symptom Disorder Work Group in response to the third DSM-5 draft and stakeholder review can be read here: Chapman Response to Third Draft DSM-5 SSD Proposals

May 26, 2012

While media and professional attention has been focused on the implications for introducing new disorders into the DSM and lowering diagnostic thresholds for existing categories, the Somatic Symptom Disorders (SSD) Work Group has been quietly redefining DSM’s Somatoform Disorders with radical proposals that could bring millions more patients under a mental health diagnosis.

The SSD Work Group is proposing to rename the Somatoform Disorders section of DSM-IV to “Somatic Symptom Disorders,” eliminate four existing  DSM-IV categories: somatization disorder [300.81], hypochondriasis [300.7], pain disorder*, and undifferentiated somatoform disorder [300.82] and replace them with a single new category – “Somatic Symptom Disorder.”

*In DSM-IV: Pain Disorder associated with a general medical condition (only): Psychological factors, if present, are judged to play no more than a minimal role. This is not considered a mental disorder so it is coded on Axis III with general medical conditions.See http://behavenet.com/pain-disorder for definitions and criteria for other DSM-IV presentations of Pain disorder.  For DSM-5, it appears that all presentations of Pain disorder will be subsumed under the new SSD category.

If approved, these proposals will license the application of a mental health diagnosis for all illnesses – whether “established general medical conditions or disorders” like diabetes, heart disease and cancer or conditions presenting with “somatic symptoms of unclear etiology” – if the clinician considers the patient is devoting too much time to their symptoms and that their life has become “subsumed” by health concerns and preoccupations, or their response to distressing somatic symptoms is “excessive” or “disproportionate,” or their coping strategies “maladaptive.”

Somatoform Disorders – disliked and dysfunctional

The SSD Work Group, under Chair, Joel E. Dimsdale, MD, says current terminology for the Somatoform Disorders is confusing and flawed; that no-one likes these disorders and they are rarely used in clinical psychiatric practice. Primary Care physicians don’t understand the terms and patients find them demeaning and offensive [1,2].

The group says the terms foster mind/body dualism; that the concept of “medically unexplained” is unreliable, especially in the presence of medical illness, and cites high prevalence of presentation with “medically unexplained somatic symptoms” (MUS) in general medical settings – 20% in Primary Care, 40% in Specialist Care, 33-61% in Neurology; that basing a diagnosis of psychiatric disorder on MUS alone is too sensitive.

The Work Group might have considered dispensing altogether with a clutch of disliked, dysfunctional categories. Instead, the group proposes to rebrand these disorders and assign new criteria that will capture patients with diverse illnesses, expanding application of psychiatric services, antidepressants and behavioural therapies like CBT, for the “modification of dysfunctional and maladaptive beliefs about symptoms and disease, and behavioral techniques to alter illness and sick role behaviors.”

Focus shifts from “medically unexplained” to “excessive thoughts, behaviors and feelings”

The Work Group’s proposal is to deemphasize “medically unexplained” as the central defining feature of this disorder group.

For DSM-5, focus shifts to the patient’s cognitions – “excessive thoughts, behaviors and feelings” about the seriousness of distressing and persistent somatic (bodily) symptoms – which may or may not accompany diagnosed general medical conditions – and the extent to which “illness preoccupation” is perceived to “dominate” or “subsume” the patient’s life.

“[The SSD Work Group’s] framework will allow a diagnosis of somatic symptom disorder in addition to a general medical condition, whether the latter is a well-recognized organic disease or a functional somatic syndrome such as irritable bowel syndrome or chronic fatigue syndrome…” [3]

“…These disorders typically present first in non-psychiatric settings and somatic symptom disorders can accompany diverse general medical as well as psychiatric diagnoses. Having somatic symptoms of unclear etiology is not in itself sufficient to make this diagnosis. Some patients, for instance with irritable bowel syndrome or fibromyalgia would not necessarily qualify for a somatic symptom disorder diagnosis. Conversely, having somatic symptoms of an established disorder (e.g. diabetes) does not exclude these diagnoses if the criteria are otherwise met…” [4]

To meet requirements for Somatization Disorder (300.81) in DSM-IV, a considerably more rigorous criteria set needed to be fulfilled: a history of many medically unexplained symptoms before the age of thirty, resulting in treatment sought or psychosocial impairment. The diagnostic threshold was set high – a total of eight or more medically unexplained symptoms from four, specified symptom groups, with at least four pain and two gastrointestinal symptoms.

In DSM-5, the requirement for eight symptoms is dropped to just one.

One distressing symptom for at least six months duration and one “B type” cognition is all that is required to tick the box for a bolt-on diagnosis of a mental health disorder – cancer + SSD; angina + SSD; diabetes + SSD; IBS + SSD…

The most recent proposals for new category “J 00 Somatic Symptom Disorder.”

Note that the requirement for “at least two from the B type criteria” for the second draft has been reduced to “at least one from the B type criteria” for the third iteration of draft proposals. This lowering of the threshold is presumably in order to accommodate the merging of the previously proposed “Simple Somatic Symptom Disorder” category into the “Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder” category, a conflation now proposed to be renamed to “Somatic Symptom Disorder.” No revised “Disorder Description” and “Rationale/Validity” documents reflecting the changes made between draft two and draft three were issued for the third and final draft.

Ed: Update: Following closure of the third stakeholder review on June 15, 2012, proposals, criteria and rationales were frozen and the DSM-5 Development website was not updated to reflect any subsequent revisions. Proposals, criteria and rationales, as posted for the third draft in May 2012, were removed from the DSM-5 Development website on November 15, 2012 and placed behind a non public log in. Consequently, criteria as they had stood for “Somatic Symptom Disorder” at the point at which the third draft was issued can no longer be accessed but are set out on Slide 9 in this presentation, which note, does not include three, optional Severity Specifiers that were included with the third draft criteria. Since any changes to the drafts are embargoed in preparation for publication of DSM-5, in May 2013, I cannot confirm whether any changes have been made to the draft subsequent to June 15, 2012.

IASP and the Classification of Pain in ICD-11  Prof. Dr. Winfried Rief, University of Marburg, Germany

Slide 9

Rief Presentation ICD-11 Pain

How are highly subjective and difficult to measure constructs like “Disproportionate and persistent thoughts about the seriousness of one’s symptoms” and “Excessive time and energy devoted to these symptoms or health concerns” to be operationalized?

By what means would a practitioner determine how much of a patient’s day spent “searching the internet looking for data” (to quote an example of the SSD Work Group Chair) might be considered a reasonable response to chronic health concerns and what should be coded as “excessive preoccupation” or indicate that this patient’s life has become “subsumed” or “overwhelmed” by concerns about illness and symptoms? One hour day? Two hours? Three?

At the APA’s Annual Conference earlier this month, SSD Work Group Chair, Joel E. Dimsdale, presented an update on his group’s deliberations. During the Q & A session, an academic professional in the field expressed concern that practitioners who are not psychiatric professionals or clinicians might have some difficulty interpreting the wording of the B type criteria to differentiate between negative and positive coping strategies.

Dr Dimsdale was asked to expand on how the B type criteria would be defined and by what means patients with chronic medical conditions who devote time and energy to health care strategies to try to improve their symptoms and level of functioning would be evaluated in the field by the very wide range of DSM users; how would these patients be differentiated from patients considered to be spending “excessive time and energy devoted to symptoms or health concerns” or perceived as having become “absorbed” by their illness?

I am not persuaded by Dr Dimsdale’s reassurances that his Work Group will try to make this “crystal clear” in the five to six pages of manual text in the process of being drafted for this disorder chapter. Nor am I reassured that these B (1), (2) and (3) criteria can be safely applied outside the optimal conditions of field trials, in settings where practitioners may not necessarily have the time for, nor instruction in administration of diagnostic assessment tools, and where decisions to code or not to code may hang on arbitrary and subjective perceptions of DSM end-users lacking clinical training in the use of the manual text and application of criteria.

Implications for a diagnosis of SSD for all patient populations

Incautious, inept application of criteria resulting in a “bolt-on” psychiatric diagnosis of a “Somatic Symptom Disorder” could have far-reaching implications for all patient populations:

Application of highly subjective and difficult to measure criteria could potentially result in misdiagnosis with a mental health disorder, misapplication of an additional diagnosis of a mental health disorder or missed diagnoses through dismissal and failure to investigate new or worsening somatic symptoms.

Patients with cancer and life threatening diseases may be reluctant to report new symptoms that might be early indicators of local recurrence, metastasis or secondary disease, for fear of attracting a diagnosis of “SSD” or of being labelled as “catastrophisers.”

Application of an additional diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorder may have implications for the types of medical investigations, tests and treatments that clinicians are prepared to consider and which insurers prepared to fund.

Application of an additional diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorder may impact payment of employment, medical and disability insurance and the length of time for which insurers are prepared to pay out. It may negatively influence the perceptions of agencies involved with the assessment and provision of social care, disability adaptations, education and workplace accommodations.

Patients prescribed psychotropic drugs for perceived unreasonable levels of “illness worry” or “excessive preoccupation with symptoms” may be placed at risk of iatrogenic disease or subjected to inappropriate behavioural therapies.

For multi-system diseases like Multiple Sclerosis, Behçet’s syndrome or Systemic lupus it can take several years before a diagnosis is arrived at. In the meantime, patients with chronic, multiple somatic symptoms who are still waiting for a diagnosis would be vulnerable.

The burden of the DSM-5 changes will fall particularly heavily upon women who are more likely to be casually dismissed when presenting with physical symptoms and more likely to receive inappropriate antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications for them.

Proposals allow for the application of a diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorder where a parent is considered excessively concerned with a child’s symptoms [3]. Families caring for children with any chronic illness may be placed at increased risk of wrongful accusation of “over-involvement” with a child’s symptomatology.

Where a parent is perceived as encouraging maintenance of “sick role behaviour” in a child, this may provoke social services investigation or court intervention for removal of a sick child out of the home environment and into foster care or for enforced in-patient “rehabilitation.” This is already happening in families with a child or young person with chronic illness, notably with Chronic fatigue syndrome or ME. It may happen more frequently with a diagnosis of a chronic childhood illness + SSD.

Dustbin diagnosis?

Although the Work Group is not proposing to classify Chronic fatigue syndrome, IBS and fibromyalgia, per se, within the Somatic Symptom Disorders, patients with CFS – “almost a poster child for medically unexplained symptoms as a diagnosis,” according to Dr Dimsdale’s presentation – or with fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic Lyme disease, Gulf War illness, chemical injury and chemical sensitivity may be particularly vulnerable to misapplication or misdiagnosis with a mental health disorder under these SSD criteria.

There is considerable concern that this new Somatic Symptom Disorder category will provide a “dustbin diagnosis” in which to shovel the so-called “functional somatic syndromes.”

15% of “diagnosed illness” and 26% of “functional somatic” captured by SSD criteria

For testing reliability of CSSD criteria, three groups were studied for the field trials:

488 healthy patients; a “diagnosed illness” group of 205 patients with cancer and malignancy (some in this group were said to have severe coronary disease) and a “functional somatic” group comprising 94 people with irritable bowel and “chronic widespread pain” (a term used synonymously with fibromyalgia).

Patients in the study were required to meet one to three cognitions: Do you often worry about the possibility that you have a serious illness? Do you have the feeling that people are not taking your illness seriously enough? Is it hard for you to forget about yourself and think about all sorts of other things?

Dr Dimsdale reports that if the response was “Yes – a lot.” then [CSSD] was coded.

15% of the cancer and malignancy group met SSD criteria when “one of the B type criteria” was required; if the threshold was increased to “two B type criteria” about 10% met criteria for dual-diagnosis of diagnosed illness + Somatic Symptom Disorder.

For the 94 irritable bowel and “chronic widespread pain” study group, about 26% were coded when one cognition was required; 13% coded with two cognitions required.

Has the SSD Work Group produced projections for prevalence estimates and potential increase in mental health diagnoses across the entire disease landscape?

Did the Work Group seek opinion on the medico-legal implications of missed diagnoses?

Has the group factored for the clinical and economic burden of providing CBT for modifying perceived “dysfunctional and maladaptive beliefs about symptoms and disease, and behavioral techniques to alter illness and sick role behaviors” in patients for whom an additional diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorder has been coded?

Where’s the science?

Dr Dimsdale admits his committee has struggled from the outset with these B type criteria but feels its proposals are “a step in the right direction.”

The group reports that preliminary analysis of field trial results shows “good reliability between clinicians and good agreement between clinician rated and patient rated severity.” In the trials, CSSD achieved Kappa values of .60 (.41-.78 Confidence Interval).

Kappa reliability reflects agreement in rating by two different clinicians corrected for chance agreement – it does not mean that what they have agreed upon are valid constructs.

Radical change to the status quo needs grounding in scientifically validated constructs and a body of rigorous studies not on pet theories and papers (in some cases unpublished papers) generated by Dr Dimsdale’s work group colleagues.

Where is the substantial body of independent research evidence to support the group’s proposals?

“...To receive a diagnosis of complex somatic symptom disorder, patients must complain of at least one somatic symptom that is distressing and/or disruptive of their daily lives. Also, patients must have at least two [Ed: now reduced to at least one since evaluation of the CSSD field trials] of the following emotional/cognitive/behavioral disturbances: high levels of health anxiety, disproportionate and persistent concerns about the medical seriousness of the symptom(s), and an excessive amount of time and energy devoted to the symptoms and health concerns. Finally, the symptoms and related concerns must have lasted for at least six months.”

“Future research will examine the epidemiology, clinical characteristics, or treatment of complex somatic symptom disorder as there is no published research on this diagnostic category.”

“…Just as for complex somatic symptom disorder, there is no published research on the epidemiology, clinical characteristics, or treatment of simple somatic symptom disorder.”

Source: Woolfolk RL, Allen LA. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Somatoform Disorders. Standard and Innovative Strategies in Cognitive Behavior Therapy.

Where are the professionals?

During the second public review, the Somatic Symptom Disorders proposals attracted more responses than almost any other category. The SSD Work Group is aware that patients, caregivers and patient advocacy organizations have considerable concerns. But are medical and allied health professionals scrutinizing these proposals?

This is the last opportunity to submit feedback. Psychiatric and non psychiatric clinicians, primary care practitioners and specialists, allied health professionals, psychologists, counselors, social workers, lawyers, patient advocacy organizations – please look very hard at these proposals, consider their safety and the implications for an additional diagnosis of an SSD for all patient illness groups and weigh in with your comments by June 15.

Criteria and rationales for the third iteration of proposals for the DSM-5 Somatic Symptom Disorders categories can be found here on the DSM-5 Development site. [Update: Proposals were removed from the DSM-5 Development website on November 15, 2012.]

References

1 Levenson JL. The Somatoform Disorders: 6 Characters in Search of an Author. Psychiatr Clin North Am. 2011 Sep;34(3):515-24.

2 Dimsdale JE. Medically Unexplained Symptoms: A Treacherous Foundation for Somatoform Disorders? Psychiatr Clin North Am. 2011 Sep;34(3):511-3.

3 Dimsdale J, Creed F. DSM-V Workgroup on Somatic Symptom Disorders: the proposed diagnosis of somatic symptom disorders in DSM-V to replace somatoform disorders in DSM-IV – a preliminary report. J Psychosom Res 2009;66:473–6.

4 DSM-5 Somatic Symptom Disorders Work Group Disorder Descriptions and Justification of Criteria-Somatic Symptoms documents, published May 4, 2011 for the second DSM-5 stakeholder review.

(Caveat: for background to the SSD Work Group’s rationales only; proposals and criteria as set out in these documents have not been revised to reflect changes to revisions or reissued for the third review.)

    Disorder Descriptions   May 4, 2011

    Rationale/Validity Document   May 4, 2011

© Copyright 2015 Suzy Chapman

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis Parts 1 and 2

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis, Parts 1 and 2

Post #161 Shortlink: http://wp.me/pKrrB-248

Below, I am posting the Abstract and Introduction to Parts 1 and 2 of Philos Ethics Humanit Med Review “The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis.”

Part 1 of this Review was published on January 13, 2012; Part 2 was published (as a provisional PDF) on April 18, 2012. I will post Part 3 when it becomes available.

Below Parts 1 and 2, I have posted the PDFs for Phillips J (ed): Symposium on DSM-5: Part 1. Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 2010, 17(1):1–26 and Phillips J (ed): Symposium on DSM-5: Part 2. Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 2010, 17(2):1–75 out of which grew the concept for the Philos Ethics Humanit Med Review Parts 1 and 2.

This is an interesting series of exchanges which expand on conceptual and definitional issues discussed in these two Bulletins but these are quite lengthy documents, 29 and 30 pp, respectively; PDFs are provided rather than full texts.

Review Part One

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3305603/

Philos Ethics Humanit Med. 2012; 7: 3.
Published online 2012 January 13. doi: 10.1186/1747-5341-7-3 PMCID: PMC3305603

Copyright ©2012 Phillips et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.
Received August 15, 2011; Accepted January 13, 2012.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

      The six most essential questions Part 1

or: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3305603/pdf/1747-5341-7-3.pdf

Html: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3305603/

or http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/3

James Phillips,corresponding author1 Allen Frances,2 Michael A Cerullo,3 John Chardavoyne,1 Hannah S Decker,4 Michael B First,5 Nassir Ghaemi,6 Gary Greenberg,7 Andrew C Hinderliter,8 Warren A Kinghorn,2,9 Steven G LoBello,10 Elliott B Martin,1 Aaron L Mishara,11 Joel Paris,12 Joseph M Pierre,13,14 Ronald W Pies,6,15 Harold A Pincus,5,16,17,18 Douglas Porter,19 Claire Pouncey,20 Michael A Schwartz,21 Thomas Szasz,15 Jerome C Wakefield,22,23 G Scott Waterman,24 Owen Whooley,25 and Peter Zachar10
 
1Department of Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine, 300 George St., Suite 901, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
2Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Duke University Medical Center, 508 Fulton St., Durham, NC 27710, USA
3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Neuroscience, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 260 Stetson Street, Suite 3200, Cincinnati, OH 45219, USA
4Department of History, University of Houston, 524 Agnes Arnold, Houston, 77204, USA
5Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, Division of Clinical Phenomenology, New York State Psychiatric Institute, 1051 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10032, USA
6Department of Psychiatry, Tufts Medical Center, 800 Washington Street, Boston, MA 02111, USA
7Human Relations Counseling Service, 400 Bayonet Street Suite #202, New London, CT 06320, USA
8Department of Linguistics, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 4080 Foreign Languages Building, 707 S Mathews Ave, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
9Duke Divinity School, Box 90968, Durham, NC 27708, USA
10Department of Psychology, Auburn University Montgomery, 7061 Senators Drive, Montgomery, AL 36117, USA
11Department of Clinical Psychology, The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, 325 North Wells Street, Chicago IL, 60654, USA
12Institute of Community and Family Psychiatry, SMBD-Jewish General Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, 4333 cote Ste. Catherine, Montreal H3T1E4 Quebec, Canada
13Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, 760 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
14VA West Los Angeles Healthcare Center, 11301 Wilshire Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90073, USA
15Department of Psychiatry, SUNY Upstate Medical University, 750 East Adams St., #343CWB, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA
16Irving Institute for Clinical and Translational Research, Columbia University Medical Center, 630 West 168th Street, New York, NY 10032, USA
17New York Presbyterian Hospital, 1051 Riverside Drive, Unit 09, New York, NY 10032, USA
18Rand Corporation, 1776 Main St Santa Monica, California 90401, USA
19Central City Behavioral Health Center, 2221 Philip Street, New Orleans, LA 70113, USA
20Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania, 3401 Market Street, Suite 320 Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
21Department of Psychiatry, Texas AMHSC College of Medicine, 4110 Guadalupe Street, Austin, Texas 78751, USA
22Silver School of Social Work, New York University, 1 Washington Square North, New York, NY 10003, USA
23Department of Psychiatry, NYU Langone Medical Center, 550 First Ave, New York, NY 10016, USA
24Department of Psychiatry, University of Vermont College of Medicine, 89 Beaumont Avenue, Given Courtyard N104, Burlington, Vermont 05405, USA
25Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging Research, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 112 Paterson St., New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA

Abstract

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

General Introduction

This article has its own history, which is worth recounting to provide the context of its composition.

As reviewed by Regier and colleagues [1], DSM-5 was in the planning stage since 1999, with a publication date initially planned for 2010 (now rescheduled to 2013). The early work was published as a volume of six white papers, A Research Agenda for DSM-V [2] in 2002. In 2006 David Kupfer was appointed Chairman, and Darrel Regier Vice-Chairman, of the DSM-5 Task Force. Other members of the Task Force were appointed in 2007, and members of the various Work Groups in 2008.

From the beginning of the planning process the architects of DSM-5 recognized a number of problems with DSM-III and DSM-IV that warranted attention in the new manual. These problems are now well known and have received much discussion, but I will quote the summary provided by Regier and colleagues:

Over the past 30 years, there has been a continuous testing of multiple hypotheses that are inherent in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, from the third edition (DSM-III) to the fourth (DSM-IV)… The expectation of Robins and Guze was that each clinical syndrome described in the Feighner criteria, RDC, and DSM-III would ultimately be validated by its separation from other disorders, common clinical course, genetic aggregation in families, and further differentiation by future laboratory tests–which would now include anatomical and functional imaging, molecular genetics, pathophysiological variations, and neuropsychological testing. To the original validators Kendler added differential response to treatment, which could include both pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions… However, as these criteria have been tested in multiple epidemiological, clinical, and genetic studies through slightly revised DSM-III-R and DSM-IV editions, the lack of clear separation of these syndromes became apparent from the high levels of comorbidity that were reported… In addition, treatment response became less specific as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors were found to be effective for a wide range of anxiety, mood, and eating disorders and atypical antipsychotics received indications for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and treatment-resistant major depression. More recently, it was found that a majority of patients with entry diagnoses of major depression in the Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression (STAR*D) study had significant anxiety symptoms, and this subgroup had a more severe clinical course and was less responsive to available treatments… Likewise, we have come to understand that we are unlikely to find single gene underpinnings for most mental disorders, which are more likely to have polygenetic vulnerabilities interacting with epigenetic factors (that switch genes on and off) and environmental exposures to produce disorders. [[2], pp. 645-646]

As the work of the DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups moved forward, a controversy developed that involved Robert Spitzer and Allen Frances, Chairmen respectively of the DSM-III and DSM-IV Task Forces. The controversy began with Spitzer’s Letter to the Editor, “DSM-V: Open and Transparent,” on July 18, 2008 in Psychiatric Times [3], detailing his unsuccessful effort to obtain minutes of the DSM-5 Task Force meetings. In ensuing months Allen Frances joined him in an exchange with members of the Task Force. In a series of articles and blog postings in Psychiatric Times, Frances (at times with Spitzer) carried out a sustained critique of the DSM-5 work in which he focused both on issues of transparency and issues of process and content [4-16]. The latter involved the Task Force and Work Group efforts to address the problems of DSM-IV with changes that, in Frances’ opinion, were premature and not backed by current scientific evidence. These changes included new diagnoses such as mixed anxiety-depression, an expanded list of addictive disorders, the addition of subthreshold conditions such as Psychosis Risk Syndrome, and overly inclusive criteria sets – all destined, in Frances’ judgment, to expand the population of the mentally ill, with the inevitable consequence of increasing the number of false positive diagnoses and the attendant consequence of exposing individuals unnecessarily to potent psychotropic medications. The changes also included extensive dimensional measures to be used with minimal scientific foundation.

Frances pointed out that the NIMH was embarked on a major effort to upgrade the scientific foundation of psychiatric disorders (described below by Michael First), and that pending the results of that research effort in the coming years, we should for now mostly stick with the existing descriptive, categorical system, in full awareness of all its limitations. In brief, he has argued, we are not ready for the “paradigm shift” hoped for in the 2002 A Research Agenda.

We should note that as the DSM-5 Work Groups were being developed, the Task Force rejected a proposal in 2008 to add a Conceptual Issues Work Group [17] – well before Spitzer and Frances began their online critiques.

In the course of this debate over DSM-5 I proposed to Allen in early 2010 that we use the pages of the Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (of which I am Editor) to expand and bring more voices into the discussion. This led to two issues of the Bulletin in 2010 devoted to conceptual issues in DSM-5 [18,19]. (Vol 17, No 1 of the AAPP Bulletin will be referred to as Bulletin 1, and Vol 17, No 2 will be referred to as Bulletin 2. Both are available at http://alien.dowling.edu/~cperring/aapp/bulletin.htm. webcite) Interest in this topic is reflected in the fact that the second Bulletin issue, with commentaries on Frances’ extended response in the first issue, and his responses to the commentaries, reached over 70,000 words.

Also in 2010, as Frances continued his critique through blog postings in Psychiatric Times, John Sadler and I began a series of regular, DSM-5 conceptual issues blogs in the same journal [20-33].

With the success of the Bulletin symposium, we approached the editor of PEHM, James Giordano, about using the pages of PEHM to continue the DSM-5 discussion under a different format, and with the goal of reaching a broader audience. The new format would be a series of “essential questions” for DSM-5, commentaries by a series of individuals (some of them commentators from the Bulletin issues, others making a first appearance in this article), and responses to the commentaries by Frances. Such is the origin of this article. (The general introduction, individual introductions, and conclusion are written by this author (JP), the responses by Allen Frances.

For this exercise we have distilled the wide-ranging discussions from the Bulletin issues into six questions, listed below with the format in which they were presented to commentators. (As explained below, the umpire metaphor in Question 1 is taken from Frances’ discussion in Bulletin 1.)…

Full document in PDF format

 

Review Part Two

(Note: Part Two was published on April 18, 2012 and addresses Questions 3 and 4. The complete article is available as a provisional PDF. The fully formatted PDF and HTML versions are in production. I will replace with the final version when available.)

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis

Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:8 doi:10.1186/1747-5341-7-8

http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/8/abstract

Published: 18 April 2012

      The six most essential questions Part 2 Provisional

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis

James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S Decker, Michael B First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C Hinderliter, Warren A Kinghorn, Steven G LoBello, Elliott B Martin, Aaron L Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M Pierre, Ronald W Pies, Harold A Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C Wakefield, G Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley and Peter Zachar

Abstract (provisional)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

The complete article is available as a provisional PDF. The fully formatted PDF and HTML versions are in production.

 

Symposium on DSM-5: Parts 1 and 2

      Bulletin Vol 17 No 1

Phillips J (ed): Symposium on DSM-5: Part 1. Bulletin of the Association for the
Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 2010, 17(1):1–26

      Bulletin Vol 17 No 2

Phillips J (ed): Symposium on DSM-5: Part 2. Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 2010, 17(2):1–75

 

One focus for this site has been the monitoring of the various iterations towards the revision of the Somatoform Disorders categories of DSM-IV, for which radical reorganization of existing DSM categories and criteria is proposed.

As the DSM-5 Development site documentation currently stands (April 27, 2012), the “Somatic Symptom Disorders” Work Group (Chaired by Joel E. Dimsdale, M.D.) proposes to rename Somatoform Disorders to “Somatic Symptom Disorders” and to fold a number of existing somatoform disorders together under a new rubric, which the Work Group proposes to call “Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder.”

Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder (CSSD) would include the previous DSM-IV diagnoses of somatization disorder [DSM IV code 300.81], undifferentiated somatoform disorder [DSM IV code 300.81], hypochondriasis [DSM IV code 300.7], as well as some presentations of pain disorder [DSM IV code 307].

There is a more recently proposed, Simple Somatic Symptom Disorder (SSSD), which requires symptom duration of just one month, as opposed to the six months required to meet the CSSD criteria. There is also an Illness Anxiety Disorder (hypochondriasis without somatic symptoms); and a proposal to rename Conversion Disorder to Functional Neurological Disorder and possibly locate under Dissociative Disorders.

There is some commentary on the Somatoform Disorders in DSM-IV in this discussion from Bulletin 1:

Bulletin Vol 17 No 1, Page 19:

Doing No Harm: The Case Against Conservatism

G. Scott Waterman, M.D. David P. Curley, Ph.D.

Department of Psychiatry, University of Vermont College of Medicine